ABSTRACT ! Ladnched 'in October 1997, the Cassini-Huygens Mission sent the largest interplanetary spacecraft ever built in'the service of science. Carrying a spite of 12 scientific instruments and an atmospheric entry I probe, this complex spacecraft to.'expldre the Saturn system may not have gotten off the ground without uhdergbing significant design changes and qost reductions. ;As a means to control operations cost, a no<el concept, called "Distributed dpeiations", was chosen. This concept utilized advances in information technology and distributed computation to decentralize the mission control room and science operations, Although other interplanetary missions have decentralized science operations, none of them can match Cassini-Huygens in the scale and complexity of the distributed system. With 12 science teams and one Huygens Probe team distributed worldwide, the coordination effort to design and integrate command sequences posed a significant challenge in mission operations, Furthermore, the spacecraft design of mounting remote sensing instruments and in-situ instruments on a fixed spacecraft bus introduced operational constraints for even the simplest of maneuvers.
instruments (Le. non-inclusion of a scan platform means spacecraft attitude is a vital shared resource); c)
The inclusion of a mission director to resolve Science vs. Engineering conflicts.
BACKGROUND: The Cassini-Huygens Mission to Saturn is a complex mission with a large multi-instrument spacecraft.
The Cassini-Huygens Mission is a joint NASA and ESA mission to study Saturn. Set to arrive at Saturn on July 1, 2004, the spacecraft carries on board a sophisticated array of cameras, spectrometers, and sensors, covering much of the electromagnetic spectrum. This suite of 12 science instruments and one planetary entry probe were designed to address the following varied set of mission objectives: a) to investigate the chemical composition and physical state of Saturn's atmosphere; b) to investigate the chemical composition and physical state of Titan's atmosphere and surface; c) to investigate thechemical composition and physical state of icy Saturnian satellites; d) to investigate the chemical composition and physical state of Saturn's rings; e) to investigate the structure and physical dynamics of the Saturnian magnetosphere.
Because we are an international mission, the Cassini-Huygens flight Operations teams are located in 8 states in the United States as well as Germany, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands. This poses major challenges in space mission operations. New concepts that go beyond the traditional "Mission Control" room paradigm must be utilized in order to effectively perform the mission objectives, while controlling operations cost.
The Need To Decentralize Cassini-Huygens Mission Operations Voyager and Galileo: A Comparison
Cassini-Huygens is similar to two prior missions to explore the outer planets in the solar system: Voyager and Galileo. All three missions sent a spacecraft (in Voyager's case two spacecraft) with a large package of science experiments. The instrument packages all included an array of remote sensing cameras and spectrometers and in-situ fields and particles sensors. Galileo shares with Cassini-Huygens a passenger, in the form of a planetary entry probe, and its associated probe telecommunications relay system. Finally, all three spacecraft spent many years in cruise before arriving at its destination.
There are also major differences between the three missions. First, the Voyager missions were not designed to orbit a planet. Planetary and satellite flybys and encounters were the name of the game for the Voyager flight operations team. Secondly, both Voyager and Galileo carried a scan platform, which allowed the remote sensing instruments to point independent of the rest of the spacecraft. This allowed the spacecraft to point to scientifically interesting targets, while having its high gain antenna point towards the Earth. As we shall see, the lack of a scan platform for Cassini-Huygens created challenges to mission operations. Thirdly, both Voyager and Galileo mission operations were modeled after a traditional 
The Advantages of Distributed Operations for Cassini-Huygens
For Cassini-Huygens, the choice of distributed operations held many advantages. First, the non-real time nature of the mission allows this to be done. Cassini-Huygens will be nominally,utllizing only one Deep Space N'etwork (DSN) tracking per day. There is no need for a continuously staffed flight team to support round the clock station coverage, seven days a week. And the long one-way light time (1.5 hours on erage) precludes much real-time commanding. Therefore, the spacecraft command process is a relegated to the development of stored command sequences. Secondly, the data architecture on-board the spacecraft is distributed. Each science instrument has its own processor, independent of the spacecraft central processor. The spacecraft central processor (called CDS), serves as a.router, retaying science instrument commands. All science instrument commanding can be pre-planned outside of JPL, and "merged" into a main stored command sequence, by a central JPL team, sometime before uplink.
Thirdly, operations cost can be controlled by "outsourcing" science operations to non-JPL sites. This along with the international nature of the mission, lends itself to decentralization. Unlike-Galileo and Voyager, where there are "liaison" science teams at JPL representing the Principal Investigator (P.I.) teams located outside JPL, Cassini-Huygens directly coordinates with the P.I. teams. Those P.I. teams interact with JPL just as any other spacecraft subsystem team. Utilizing distributed computing networks, the P.I. teams would be able to command the spacecraft and process instrument telemetry from their home institutions. Given the multiple time zones in which the P.I. teams reside, distributed operations makes sense. Finally, distributed operations has the added effect of bringing in educational and research institutions to the space exploration effort.
Distributed Operations Works Best When Subsystems And Constraints Are

Decou pled
The geographic separation of the P.I. teams, the non-real time nature of command sequence development, and the independent processors internal to each science instrument on-board the spacecraft have one thing in common: the decoupling of subsystems, responsibilities and constraints.
Case study 1 : Issue a Command Internal to a Science Instrument -Successful application of Distributed Operations
As a case study in how distributed operations works best, we will look at how a Cassini-Huygens distributed science team issues a command internal to the instrument itself. When a P.I. team wants to issue a command to the team's own instrument, there is only one spacecraft constraint they have to Montreal, Canada -May 17 -21 2004 satisfy. make sure command does not exceed power allocation. Since Cassini-Huygens manages power through the use of pre-defined power modes, as long as the team's command does not allow the instrument to draw more power than it's allocated, the command can be issued at virtually any time in the command sequence. Several weeks before the uplink of the command sequence, the P.I. team can submit the instrument command to JPL, to be merged with the rest of the sequence commands as part of the sequence development process, and radiated to the Spacecraft.
The ease and simplicity of this process can be attributed to the decoupling of the science subsystem, onboard the spacecraft via independent processors, and the clear definition of responsibilities for checking spacecraft constraints through the use of pre-defined power modes. As we shall see in the next case study, distributed operations will not be so easy if the subsystems are coupled to each other to share major resources, and constraint check responsibilities are blurred.
Distributed Operations Will Face Many Challenges When Subsystems Share -I
The Cassini-iuygens spacecraft does not have a scan platform for remote sensing instruments Both the remote sensing instruments and the in-situ fields and particles instruments are mounted OR the spacecraft bus. Two fields and particles instruments can articulate, but its range of motion is not enough to be considered to point independently from the main bus. In order to point a remote sensing instrument to observe a target, the entire Cassini spacecraft must be moved. This can expose science instruments to thermal radiation.
As with all spacecraft with remote sensing instruments, there are certain orientations which can expose the sensors and cooling elements (also called radiators) to solar and other planetary thermal radiation.
Those viewing constraints are a necessary evil in the world of spacecraft operations. However, if a spacecraft has a scan platform, an additional degree of freedom from an articulating platform can provide a margin of safety.
Resources And Responsibility
..
Case Study 2: Performing Remote Sensing in the Distributed Operations Environment, Without a Scan Platform
In the distributed operations environment of Cassini-Huygens, spacecraft pointing commands originate from the P.I. teams. They have the responsibility to design spacecraft attitude control changes, which do not violate the multitude of viewing constraint flight rules. For example, if the imaging team wants to image a particular portion of the Rings of Saturn, a team member must use ground software to model the spacecraft turn from the initial attitude to the target attitude, and perform the necessary slews in order for the camera's field of view to cover the region of space. In the Cassini-Huygens mission, this software also checks for violations of viewing constraints and generate the actual spacecraft pointing commands. It is up to the team member to not only design an observation that meets its science objectives, but also not to violate any viewing constraints. Furthermore, it is up to the P.I. team member to use as the initial attitude, the end attitude of the previous observation. Not doing this will could cause the spacecraft to attempt a 
Montreal
Engineering vs. Science: Checks and Balances
Although all members of the flight team are responsible for ensuring safe spacecraft operations, traditionally the Engineering team performs an independent a'ssessment of spacecraft health and safety.
In our imaging example above, an independent assessment of the pointing commands generated by the imaging team must be made. This is done when the imaging team delivers their command fils to the appropriate lead engineer (also called sequence lead) responsible for integrating the sequence, in the ' I -. ' . .
, I
sequence development process. ' ' Once the sequence lead receives the imaging team file, he or she will create a master sequence file by
.merging all command files received from subsystem teams. Then, the AACS (Altitude and Aficulation ,Control Subsystem) team, an arm of the Engineering team, will perform the independent check of the attitude control commands submitted by all teams. They will model the pointing profile to determine if any geometric (viewing constraint) or dynamic violations (excessive turn rates and/or accelerations) has occurred.
Because of the checks and balances set up between the Scientist and Engineer, a healthy "creative tension" exists in all JPL missions. The Scientist may want to push the operating envelope to collect some unique science data. The Engineer, on the other hand, may push the envelope back because it's too risky. Each player knows their role; each team knows their responsibility.
,
Blurring of the Lines
Returning to the example of the imaging team's Ring observations, if the P.I. team member designs a turn without any viewing constraint violations, using the approved ground software, he or she then delivers the command file to be checked by AACS. However, AACS using its own tool to check viewing constraints finds a violation from the imaging team's observation. The question then becomes who's assessment of the pointing profile is correct? If we look at this from the point of view of the centralized operations environment, the answer would most likely to use the M C S result. M C S is the expert when it comes to assessing pointing profiles.
In the distributed operations environment, the situation is trickier. Lets assume that the violation is excessive heating of the infrared spectrometer's radiator element. With this in mind, the imaging team asks the infrared spectrometer team for an assessment. Given that it's the infrared team's flight rule, they should give the definitive answer as to whether the violation is real or not. If the infrared team responds with a "no, this isn't a real violation", then the case for AACS is weakened substantially. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, we would like to present a method to assess mission operations concepts based on the Cassini-Huygens experience. The decoupling of instrument internal commanding lead to a successful implementation of distributed operations..
We should also point out the many challenges faced by the Cassini-Huygens because it lacked a scan platform. Figure 1 shows the relationship between a scan platform and the impact to centralized or 
